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1Bank Intermediation and Persistent Liquidity Eﬀects in the Presence
of a Frictionless Bond Market*
Abstract
An “expansionary” monetary policy that increases the growth rate of bank reserves is
generally believed by policymakers to induce a “liquidity eﬀect”, or a persistent decline
in short-term nominal interest rates, that stimulates real activity. Christiano, et al.
(1991,1995,1997) have incorporated this feature of the economy into equilibrium business
cycle models by introducing a commercial bank that acquires deposits from households
and channels those funds to ﬁrms, which use them to fund their working capital expenses.
Bank deposits are the only interest-bearing ﬁnancial asset available to households, and
bank loans are the only source of working capital ﬁnance available to ﬁrms. To obtain a
liquidity eﬀect in response to an unanticipated reserves injection, those models rely on an
information friction whereby households precommit to a liquid asset position prior to the
monetary shock. In practice, the capital markets are a major source of working capital
ﬁnance, and U.S. data indicate that bank ﬁnancing as a share of total short-term working
capital ﬁnance is countercyclical. This paper extends this literature by introducing a bond
market that allows for nonintermediated loans directly from households to ﬁrms, and ex-
amines the information friction that could induce liquidity eﬀects and countercyclicality
in the degree of bank intermediation of working capital ﬁnance. The results indicate: (i)
“sticky prices” are neither necessary nor suﬃcient to induce a liquidity eﬀect; (ii) deposit
precommitment by households along with a presetting of the deposit rate by banks does
induce persistent liquidity eﬀects, but results in excess volatility of consumption and invest-
ment; (iii) minimizing the deposit precommitment, while maintaining the preset deposit
rate induces a weaker liquidity eﬀect that is more in line with the data, without the excess
volatility in consumption and investment; and (iv) the share of bank intermediation in
working capital ﬁnance is countercyclical in all cases, including the absence of an informa-
tion friction. [JEL Classiﬁcations: E4,E5. Keywords: ﬁnancial intermediation, liquidity,
monetary policy.]
2I. Introduction
The principal economic functions performed by commercial banks are to: (i) act as a
ﬁnancial intermediary between lenders and borrowers, by originating loans and performing
the necessary monitoring of borrowers; (ii) engage in valued asset transformation, i.e., from
highly liquid deposit accounts to a portfolio of less liquid, generally larger denomination,
riskier assets; and (iii) play a central role in the economy’s payments system.1 These
economic functions are carried out through the traditional banking activities of providing
highly-liquid demand accounts, and aggregating those funds into larger, less liquid, risky
loans. The conduct of these activities is aﬀected by a central bank policy that alters the
total volume of reserves in the banking system, thus aﬀecting the supply of funds available
to banks in the provision of bank loans.
Christiano, et al. (1996) have well documented that an initial decline in short-term
interest rates follows a “monetary shock” in the form of an unanticipated injection of
(nonborrowed) reserves into the banking system, which is the so-called “liquidity eﬀect.”
This decline is persistent, and is the mechanism by which an “expansionary” monetary
policy is generally believed to stimulate economic activity. After this decline, Fisherian
fundamentals associated with the higher long-run inﬂation premium drive interest rates
up beyond their initial levels (where this shock is to the gross growth rate of reserves), and
the stimulus to the economy reverses. In a series of papers, Christiano (1991), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1995), and Chari, et al. (1995) have examined conditions under which
this liquidity eﬀect will be operative and will exhibit a signiﬁcant degree of persistence in
the short run as is suggested by the data. They focus on the role of banks in converting
their bank reserves and deposit funds from households into working capital loans to ﬁrms.
They examine two market frictions that may induce a liquidity eﬀect. The ﬁrst that
was originally suggested by Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992) involves a precommitment of
households to a deposit position prior to a “monetary shock.” The second, that has a long
1 This list should also include risk management which has become an increasingly im-
portant activity of banks, and ﬁnancial intermediaries in general. However, most banking
activities associated with risk management involve transactions between ﬁnancial interme-
diaries, which is not the focus of this paper. See Allen and Santomero (1998) for perspective
on this aspect of modern banking.
1tradition in Keynesian models is an ad hoc imposition of “sticky prices.” [See Goodfriend
and King (1997).]
However, in the Christiano, et al. models, bank loans are the only source of funds
available to ﬁrms, and bank deposits are the only interest-bearing ﬁnancial asset available
to households. As a consequence of the former restriction, the “degree of bank interme-
diation” or the extent to which working capital loans are ﬁnanced through bank lending
cannot vary over the business cycle, since all working capital loans are ﬁnanced by banks.
The data indicate that this is not case. Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage
of GDP is countercyclical. The second restriction permits an abstraction to be made away
from the essential role that banks play in the economy’s payment system by eﬀecting ﬁnal
settlement in the purchase of goods and services. In one version of their models, i.e., Chari,
et al. (1995), a “shopping-time” technology is employed to capture the liquidity services
of bank deposits. Otherwise, as a consequence of this second restriction, bank loans and
bank deposits carry the same interest rate, with no diﬀerence in either their level or their
volatility.
Einarsson and Marquis (2000) relax the ﬁrst restriction under which the role that
banks play as ﬁnancial intermediaries can be treated in isolation from the alternative mar-
ket mechanisms that bring together borrowers with lenders. In particular, a competitive
bond (or commercial paper) market is introduced that represents a nonintermediated, di-
rect lending channel from households to ﬁrms. This direct lending channel captures some
of the lending to ﬁrms that would otherwise orginate with the banks. As the economy
experiences shocks, the volume of lending to ﬁrms from banks versus the volume of funds
raised through direct lending from households varies. Speciﬁcally, by relaxing the second
restriction alluded to above, such that deposits carry a high liquidity value for households,
who use them for transactions purposes, then deposits are tied to consumption. In this
case, consumption-smoothing can limit the ability of banks, say, to raise adequate funds in
response to a positive productivity shock in order to provide bank loans to the full extent
of the (percentage) increase in demand that they are experiencing. Therefore, direct lend-
ing assumes a larger share of the funds made available for working capital ﬁnance, thus
resulting in the countercyclical role of bank lending as a share of the total working capital
2ﬁnanced by ﬁrms as is evidenced in the data.
This paper extends Einarsson and Marquis (2000) in a number of ways. First, it
recognizes that not all ﬁrms have a quality rating that would permit them to issue bonds,
but instead must resort to a ﬁnancial intermediary to facilitate the loan between households
and ﬁrms. To account for this factor in the aggregate ﬁrm context, bank loans and bonds
are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, as in Marquis (2000). This assumption enables
an examination to be made of the diﬀerences in interest rate behavior as well as in the
volume of lending with respect to bank loans versus bonds. Second, restrictions that could
lead to a liquidity eﬀect are examined within the context of a model with a more complete
ﬁnancial sector. To facilitate this comparison, monopolistically-competitive intermediate
goods producers are introduced that must ﬁnance their wage bill prior to production. Two
potential restrictions are placed on the model that could induce liquidity eﬀects. The ﬁrst
is that monopolistic producers set prices in advance of the shock. As in some of versions
of Christiano, et al. (1996), this degree of price stickiness is insuﬃcient to bring about
a liquidity eﬀect. Thus, their result is seen to generalize to a model that incoporates
three additional features of the economy that signiﬁcantly aﬀect asset allocations: a bond
market, a market for reproducible capital, and an explicit role for banks to play in the
economy’s payment system.
The second restriction is that the deposit market clears prior to the realization of
the money shock. This involves both a precommitment of deposits by households and a
determination of the deposit rate prior to the shock. These restrictions do induce a strong
liquidity eﬀect, as is true for the deposit precommitment case in Christiano et al. It is
noteworthy that, in this model, it is not necessary for this result that gross investment
also be funded out of working capital ﬁnance and that the gross investment decision also
represent a precommitment prior to the money shock, as is the case in Christiano (1991),
for example. Moreover, the model produces persistence in the liquidity eﬀect, without
imposing additional frictions of an arbitrary transaction cost incurred by households for
adjusting their ﬁnancial asset portfolio that induces a sluggish, partial adjustment of de-
posits in periods subsequent to the shock as in Christiano et al. (1995). This persistence is
shown to be due to the presence of the bond market. Absent the bond market, households
3are forced to absorb the monetary shock with liquid asset holdings, thus keeping the de-
mand for real money balances relatively high and bringing about a slow price adjustment.
The availability of the bond market provides households with a savings asset that helps
to insulate their income somewhat from inﬂation. Thus, in response to a monetary shock,
the demand for bonds increases, thereby mitigating the demand for real money balances,
and inducing an overshooting of prices relative to their long-run equilibrium path. Con-
sequently, the sharper initial price response results in lower expected inﬂation premia in
nominal interest rates that dissipate slowly.
A ﬁnal version of this model is estimated that minimizes the deposit precommitment,
where only one percent of household deposits are precommited, but retains the presetting
of the deposit rate by the bank. In this case, a persistent liquidity eﬀect is still present and
slightly weaker, which brings it more into line with the data, while removing the excess
volatility in consumption. This suggests that deposit rate setting by the banks may be the
more important friction that induces the liquidity eﬀects that are observed in the data.
The model is developed in the section II. The calibration is described in Section III,
and the simulation results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. The Theoretical Model.
The model consists of ﬁve sectors: households, ﬁnal goods producers, intermediate goods
producers, commercial banks, and the monetary authority. Households provide labor ser-
vices to intermediate goods producers and purchase ﬁnal goods. They make labor/leisure,
consumption/savings, and ﬁnancial portfolio allocation decisions, where the last of these
determines the stocks of money, bank deposits, and corporate bonds to carry forward into
the next period. Its consumption goods purchases are constrained by a payments system
technology in which the beginning-of-period stocks of real money and deposit balances
limit the volume of real purchases. Firms in the ﬁnal goods sector are competitive, and
employ a Dixit-Stiglitz production technology that transforms intermediate goods into ﬁ-
nal goods, and yields a downward-sloping demand for intermediate goods. Intermediate
goods producers are thus monopolistic competitors that buy capital goods from the ﬁnal
goods producers and rent labor services from households to produce intermediate goods for
4which they charge an equilibrium mean markup of price over marginal costs. The marginal
costs are aﬀected by a ﬁnancing constraint that requires ﬁrms to pay for the labor services
prior to production. These funds are acquired through a combination of bank loans and
bonds. To account for the lack of perfect substitutability between bank loans and bonds
a ﬁnancing portfolio adjustment cost function is introduced that ensures the existence of
an optimal mix of funding sources. Banks take in deposit funds, set aside reserves to meet
their reserve requirements, and loan out the remainder of the deposit funds to intermediate
goods producers for their working capital expenses. The banks receive reserves injections
from the government at a rate determined by a stochastic policy rule. Sticky price and
limited participation versions of the model are examined in turn by having intermediate
goods producers set prices in advance of the monetary shock, and by having households
precommit to a deposit position with banks presetting interest rates prior to the money
shock, respectively.
1. Household sector.
The representative household seeks to make its optimal set of decisions that maximize





















,β ∈ (0,1) (1)
where period utility is derived from consumption, ct, and leisure, lt a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
utility function U :  2
+ →  , which is continuous, continuously-diﬀerentiable, and strictly
concave in each of its arguments, and the discount factor is given by β. In addition to
consumption and leisure, the household chooses optimal sequences for the quantity of labor
to supply to each of the intermediate goods ﬁrms, {nt(i)},∀i, where there is assumed to
be a continuum of such ﬁrms arrayed on the unit interval. The sequence of portfolio




conditioning information set for the choices of money, Md
t+1, and bonds, Bd
t+1, is denoted
Ω, and includes all contemporaneous information. The choice of deposits, Xd
t+1,m a y
exclude the contemporaneous money shock, and thus has a conditioning information set
5ΩH ⊂ Ω in the case of precommitment. Otherwise, the deposit allocation is also selected
on the basis full contemporaneous information and ΩH =Ω . 2




















where: Pt is the ﬁnal goods price; labor income is given by
 1
i=0 Wtnt(i)di,w i t hWt the
money wage; rd
t and rb




the per capita proﬁts from the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm, the ith intermediate goods ﬁrm, and the
commercial bank, respectively.
The household’s nominal consumption purchases are constrained by a payments sys-
tem technology that is premised on the degree of liquidity in the household’s ﬁnancial
asset portfolio, and the fact that money and bank deposits are imperfect substitutes in
determining ﬁnal settlement.
Ptct ≤ ˜ G(Md
t ,Xd
t )( 3 )
where ˜ G :  2
+ →  + is the payments technology that is continuous, continuously-diﬀerenti-
able, concave in each argument, and homogeneous of degree one in Md
t and Xd
t .
The household also faces a time resource constraint:
 1
i=0
nt(i)di + lt ≤ 1( 4 )




2 Later in the paper we also examine the case of in which only a fraction of households
precommit to their deposit position, while the remainder fully adjust their ﬁnancial asset
portfolios after observing the money shock.
62. A recursive formulation of the household’s problem.
To set up this problem recursively, it is necessary to obtain a stationary version of the
model. Looking ahead, this can be achieved by normalizing all nominal variables on the
volume of bank reserves denoted Zt, whose gross growth rate µt ≡ Zt+1/Zt is stochastic
and determined by an exogenous policy rule. Dropping the time subscripts, deﬁne the
following set of normalized variables: p ≡ P/Z;md ≡ Md/Z;x ≡ Xd/Z;bd ≡ Bd/Z;w ≡
W/Z;πF ≡ ΠF/Z;πI(i) ≡ ΠI(i)/Z;a n dπCB ≡ ΠCB/Z. The household’s value function
is given by vH(sH), where the household’s state vector is deﬁned as sH ≡ [md,x d,b d;S],
with S representing the aggregate state vector deﬁned below. The dynamic program can
then be formulated as follows [where next period’s values are denoted by primes ( )and the
subscript on the expectations operators indicates the appropriate conditioning information
set]:













where the household’s optimal set of decision rules is given by [xd 
(sH),γh(sH)], with the
subset γh(sH) ≡ [c(sH),l(sH),n(i,sH),m d (sH),b d (sH)]. The feasible set of decision rules
is denoted Γh(sH), and is deﬁned by the constraint set given by the normalized budget,
normalized payment system, and time resource constraints displayed below, where the












pc ≤ G(md,x d)( 7 )
 1
i=0
nt(i)di + lt ≤ 1( 8 )
where G = ˜ G/Z.
7The solution to the above dynamic programming problem yields the following set of
Euler equations (where subcripts on U and G indicate partial derivatives).
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= 0 (11)
These three Euler equations have the interpretation of optimal marginal decisions, say,
to reduce leisure by one unit today in order to increase labor supply, with the additional
labor income carried forward in the form of bonds, equation (9), money, equation (10),
and deposits, equation (11).
3. Final goods sector.
The ﬁnal goods sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and is modeled as a single
aggregate price-taking, zero-proﬁt ﬁrm. The sole factors of production are intermediate










di, γ > 1 (12)
where et is the per capita output of ﬁnal goods, and yd
t(i)i st h eper capita input of
intermediate goods from the ith ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector.
Deﬁne the unit price of the ith intermediate good to be Qt(i). Then, the period proﬁt
function for the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm is given by:
ΠF





The ﬁrm has no dynamic choices and can therefore maximize proﬁts period-by-period







subject to (13). Deﬁning the normalized intermediate goods price as qt(i)=Qt(i)/Zt,t h e







Equation (15) represents the zero-proﬁt conditions for the ﬁrm.
4. The intermediate goods sector.
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers with identical technologies that
transform capital and labor services into output. This technology is stochastic with each
ﬁrm receiving the same productivity shock. Sales from the ith ﬁrm cannot exceed this




where yt(i) is the ﬁrm’s output, θ is the productivity shock that is assumed to follow a
ﬁrst-order Markov process, and F :  2
+ →  + is a constant returns to scale production
technology that is continuous, continuously-diﬀerentiable, and concave in its arguments of
capital, kd
t(i), and labor, nd
t(i).
As a monopoly producer, this ﬁrm faces a downward-sloping demand for its product,
such that:
yt(i) ≥ D[Qt(i),P t,e t] (17)
where D :  3
+ →  + is the demand function that is homogeneous of degree one in et and
homogenous of degree γ in Pt and −γ in Qt(i).
While the ﬁrm is assumed to ﬁnance its gross investment out of current revenues,
its wage bill is ﬁnanced from the proceeds of bank loans and bond issuance. Assuming
one-period bonds with a face value at date t of Bt+1(i), and one-period bank loans with
9a face value at date t of V d
t+1(i), where both are retired at date t + 1, the ﬁrm faces the
following ﬁnancing constraint:
Wtnd
t(i) ≤ Bt+1(i)+V d
t+1(i) (18)
To capture the lack of perfect substitutability between bonds and bank loans, the ﬁrm
is assumed to pay a ﬁnancing cost that varies with the composition of ﬁnance. This
function is denoted ˜ T[Bt+1(i),Vd
t+1(i),P], where ˜ T :  3
+ →  , and is continuous and
continuously-diﬀerentiable in each argument, and convex in Bt+1(i)a n dV d
t+1(i), and lin-
early, homogeneous of degree one in Pt.
Period proﬁts for the ﬁrm are given by nominal sales revenues less gross investment
expenditures less the cost of retiring its debt less its ﬁnancing cost.
ΠI




t − (1 + rb
t)Bt(i) − ˜ T[Bt+1(i),Vd
t+1(i),P],δ ∈ (0,1) (19)
where δ is the rate of depreciation on capital, and rv
t is the bank loan rate.
Assuming that there are no agency costs such that the ﬁrm acts in the interest of its
shareholders, and that the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are paid out each period as dividends, it will choose
its production point [Qt(i),y t(i)], its factor inputs [kd
t(i),n d
t(i)], and its working capital
ﬁnancing mix [Bt+1(i),Vd
t+1(i)] in order to maximize the present discounted value of its























t+1 denotes the partial derivative of ˜ G with respect to Md
t+1. Note that dividends
are paid in monetary units (dollars), which must be held one period before using each dollar
to purchase ˜ GMd
t+1/Pt+1 units of consumption goods, ct+1. Each unit of consumption is
10valued next period at its marginal utility value, Uct+1, and must be discounted back one
period as determined by the discount factor, β, to obtain its present value.
This optimization takes [kd
0(i),B 0(i),Vd
0 (i)] as given, and is subject to the constraints
imposed by the ﬁrm’s technology, (16), its product demand schedule, (17), and its ﬁnancing
constraint, (18). In addition, “sticky prices” may be introduced by restricting the condi-
tioning information set, ΩI, to exclude the current period monetary shock. Otherwise,
prices are assumed to be set under full information, where ΩI =Ω .
5. A recursive representation of the ith intermediate goods ﬁrm’s optimization.
Dropping time subscripts, deﬁne the normalized variables b(i) ≡ B(i)/Z, vd(i) ≡
V d(i)/Z,a n dq(i) ≡ Q(i)/Z, and let the ﬁrm’s state vector be deﬁned by sI(i) ≡ [kd(i),b(i),
vd(i);S] and the ﬁrm’s value function be given by vi[sI(i)]. The ﬁrm’s dynamic program
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where T = ˜ T/Z, and the ﬁrm’s optimal decision rules are given by (q[i,sI(i)],γi[sI(i)]),
with γi[sI(i)] ≡ (kd [i,sI(i)],n d[i,sI(i)],y[i,sI(i)],b  [i,sI(i)],vd [i,sI(i)]) . These decision
rules are chosen from the feasible set, Γi[sI(i)] , given by the ﬁrm’s production technology,
its product demand schedule, and its ﬁnancing constraint, which can be rewritten after
normalization as follows.
y(i) ≤ θF[kd(i),n d(i)] (22)
y(i) ≥ D[q(i),p,e] (23)
11wnd(i) ≤ [b (i)+vd 
(i)]µ (24)
The Euler equations for this optimization problem become:
EΩ
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= 0 (28)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on (23).
Equation (25) represents the optimal marginal decision, say, to reduce investment and
use the proceeds to increase the dividend payout. Note that the second term in (25) is
the discounted value of the usual penalty for a marginal reduction in next period’s capital
stock, while the last term, involving λ, reﬂects the loss from tightening the product demand
schedule constraint that is faced by the monopolist next period.
Equations (26) and (27) represent optimal marginal decision, say, to increase employ-
ment in the current period in order to raise production and increase the dividend payout,
with the greater cost reﬂected in higher bond ﬁnancing in (26) and higher bank loan ﬁ-
nancing in (27). Note here that there is an additional current period cost to the ﬁrm of
adjusting its ﬁnancing mix, which is captured by the terms involving the partial deriva-
tives, Tbd  and Tvd , and there is an additional beneﬁt of the higher production from a
relaxation of the product demand schedule constraint faced by the monopolist, as reﬂected
in the last term of both equations.
Equation (28) is the optimal intratemporal marginal decision on price setting, where a
higher product price raises revenues but tightens the product demand schedule constraint.
126. The banking sector.
The commercial banking sector is competitive and is represented by a single aggregate
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. However, under deposit precommitment by households, the deposit
market clears prior to the monetary shock. This implies that the equilibrium level of bank
deposits and the equilibrium bank deposit rate are predetermined with respect to the
current realization of the monetary policy actions. Monetary shocks are therefore absorbed
by the bank loan market.
Using the prime notation, the bank begins the period by receiving per capita deposits,
X , from households, against which it must set aside reserves. The bank retains required
reserves, Zr, in the amount:
Zr  = ζX ,ζ ∈ (0,1) (29)
where ζ is the reserve requirement ratio. In the case of deposit precommitment by house-
holds, Zr  = EΩH[Z ]. For the case of no precommitment, Zr  = Z . The remainder of
the bank’s deposit funds along with any unanticipated injection of reserves by the central
bank are loaned out to ﬁrms in the amount:
V   =( 1− ζ)X  + Ru (30)
where Ru ≡ Z  − EΩH[Z ] denotes the unanticipated reserve injection. Normalizing on Z,





(1 − ζ)x  +1− EΩH[µ]/µ, with deposit precommitment
[(1 − ζ)/ζ], without deposit precommitment (31)
Each period the bank pays dividends to households equal to its (per capita) net cash




r  +( 1+r
v )V
  − (1 + r
d 
+ ξ)X
 ,ξ > 0 (32)
where ξ is the marginal cost of servicing deposit accounts. Equilibrium deposit and bank
loan rates are found as the ﬁrst-order condition to the period proﬁt-(net cash ﬂow-) max-
13imization, consistent with the bank choosing its balance sheet for the upcoming period,
or
max
Zr ,X  EΩH

max
V   Π
CB 
(33)
subject to its reserves requirements, equation (29), and its balance sheet constraint, equa-
tion (30).
After normalization, the ﬁrst-order condition becomes:
1+rd 
+ ξ − ζ =( 1− ζ)EΩH(1 + rv ) (34)
Looking ahead, we note that from equation (31), a positive monetary shock can cause
the supply of bank loans to rise relative to deposits, and from equation (34), the bank
loan rate to fall. This is the source of the liquidity eﬀect in models of Christiano, et al.
(previously cited). However, in those models no distinction is made between the bank loan
rate and the deposit rate. In this model, under deposit precommitment, the deposit rate
is unaﬀected by the monetary shock in the current period since the deposit market has
already cleared.
7. The monetary authority.
The only role of government in the model is to provide reserves to the banking system.
It does so in accordance with a reserves growth rule,
Z  = µZ, E[µ] >β , (35)
where µ is stochastic and follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process.
8. Equilibrium.
Let the aggregate state vector be deﬁned as S =[ m,x,b,v,k;θ,µ] and the aggregate
laws of motion as Λ1(S)=[ m  = m(S),x   = x(S),v  = v(S),k   = k(S)]. The vector of
aggregate per capita decision rules is given by: Λ2(S)=[ C(S),N(i,S),L(S), ˜ md(S), ˜ xd(S),
˜ bd(S)].
14A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy can be deﬁned as: (i) the set of
household decision rules: [xd 
(sH),γh(sH)]; (ii) the set of decision rules for each of the
intermediate goods ﬁrms: (q[i,sI(i)],γi[sI(i)]), ∀i; (iii) the aggregate laws of motion,
Λ1(S), and the vector of aggregate decision rules: Λ2(S); (iv) the vector of pricing func-
tions: [p(S),q(i,S),r d(S),r v(S),r b(S),λ(S)]; (v) the aggregate laws of motion governing
the exogenous state variables, θ(S)a n dµ(S); and (vi) the value functions: vH(sH)a n d
vi(sI), ∀i,t h a ts a t i s f y :
(1) (household optimization): Equations (9)-(11), given the payment system and time
resource constraints, equations (7) and (8);
(2) (proﬁt-maximization by the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm): Equation (15), given its production tech-
nology, equation (12);
(3) (optimization by the intermediate goods ﬁrms): Equations (25)-(28), given their tech-
nology, product demand, and ﬁnancing constraints, equations (22)-(24), ∀i ﬁrms;
(4) (proﬁt-maximization by the bank): Equation (34), given the reserve requirement and
technology constraints, that are combined in equation (31);
(5) (aggregate consistency conditions): c(sH)=C(S),n(i,sH)=N(i,S),l(sH)=L(S),
md(sH)=˜ md(S),x d(sH)=˜ xd(S);bd(sH)=˜ bd(S);
and
(6) (equilibrium conditions): in the ﬁnal goods market: e(S)=C(S)+k (S) − (1 − δ)k;
labor market: nd(i,sI)=N(i,S),∀i; capital market:
 1
i=0 kd(i)di = k; money market:
˜ md = m; deposit market: ˜ xd = x; bank loan market:
 1
i=0 vd(i)di = v;a n dt h ebo n d
market: ˜ bd = b.
III. Calibration.
To perform the simulation exercises with the model, it is necessary to specify functional
forms for the utility function, U, the payments system technology, G, the production
technology in the intermediate goods sector, F, the demand schedule for intermediate
goods, D, and the portfolio cost function, T. The steady-state version of the model can
15then be calibrated to U.S. data, and a numerical solution to the stochastic version of the
model can be found.
1. Functional forms.
In the household sector, preferences are characterized as logarithmic, with the period
utility function given by (dropping the time subscripts):
U(c,l)=l nc + η lnl, η > 0 (36)
The payment system technology is Cobb-Douglas, and can be expressed in terms of nor-
malized variables as:
G(md,x d)=g0mdg1xd(1−g1)
,g 0 > 0,g 1 ∈ (0,1) (37)
In the intermediate goods sector, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas, or




,α ∈ (0,1), ∀i (38)
The demand schedule for intermediate goods can be expressed in terms of normalized
variables by solving the ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁnal goods sector, equation (15), for
y(i):
D[e,p,q (i)] = e[p/q(i)]γ,γ> 1, ∀i (39)
The portfolio adjustment cost function is quadratic in real bonds and real bank loans and
satisﬁes the homogeneity properties for prices:












,τ 0 > 0,τ 1 ∈ (0,1), ∀i (40)













,τ 0 > 0,τ 1 ∈ (0,1), ∀i (41)
16The aggregate laws of motion for the exogenous variables are: (i) for total factor
productivity:
lnθ  = ρp lnθ +  p ,ρ p ∈ (0,1),  p ∼ iidN(0,σp2) (42)
and (ii) for the gross growth rate of bank reserves:
lnµ  =¯ µ + ρm lnµ +  m , ¯ µ>(1 − ρm)eβ,ρ m ∈ (0,1),  m ∼ iidN(0,σm2) (43)
2. Calibration.
In equilibrium, all intermediate goods producers have the same technology and cost
structure, and face identical product demand schedules. Consequently, as monopolists,
they will choose the same production point implying y(i)=y and q(i)=q, ∀i producers.
Therefore, from equation (12),
e = y, (44)
and then from equation (15),
q = p. (45)
With these relationships, the model consists of nineteen equations: (7) -(11),(22)-
(28),(31), (34), and (42)-(45), and equilibrium in the ﬁnal goods market, seventeen en-
dogenous variables: C,k,N,L,m,x,b,v,p,q,w,rd,r b,r v,λ,two exogenous variables: θ,µ,
and seventeen parameters: g0,g 1,β,η,A,α,γ,δ,τ 0,τ 1,ζ,ξ,¯ µ, ρm,ρ p,σm,a n dσp,w h e r et h e
last four parameters are required to characterize the stochastic processes for µ and θ.T o
perform the steady-state calibration, thirteen restrictions are needed. Parameters and
steady-state values in the real sector of the economy are obtained from the calibration
procedure outlined in Cooley and Prescott (1989), with two exceptions. Government cap-
ital was excluded from the capital stock, and the stock and service ﬂows from consumer
17durables were obtained from the estimates derived by the Federal Reserve Board. Using
annual data from 1960 to 1998, this procedure yielded a quarterly capital/output ratio of
k/y = 10.516, a quarterly depreciation rate of δ = 0.0182, and a value for α = 0.314. From
the monetary data, the sample average currency-deposit ratio (with deposits deﬁned as the
sum of OCDs and DDAs) is m/x = 0.365. The prime rate and 90-day commercial paper
rate were used as proxies for the bank lending rate, rv, and the bond rate, rb, respectively.
Over the sample period 1973-1998, these rates averaged rv =9 .403 percent and rb =7 .451
percent on an annualized basis. The deposit rate was proxied by the Federal Reserve
Board’s estimate of a weighted-average rate of return on bank transaction accounts (OMS
rate), which for 1973-1999 averaged rd = 4.721 percent on an annualized basis. In the
model, the monetary rule governs the mean growth rate of bank reserves which determines
the steady-state inﬂation rate. Over the period 1960 to 1998, the CPI inﬂation rate aver-
aged 3.98 percent per year.3 The reserve requirement ratio was set equal to the current
value for transaction deposits of ζ = 0.1. For the average price mark-up in the intermediate
goods sector, we used the value of ten percent suggested by Goodfriend and King (1997),
implying that γ = 11. Data from the Quarterly Financial Reports for Manufacturing Com-
panies, 1980 was used to ﬁx the ratio of bonds to bank loans, which was set equal to the
ratio of commercial paper plus “other short-term debt” to short-term bank debt, or b/v =
0.824. Leisure time was set at L =0 .68, which is the fraction of time households devote to
leisure on average based on survey data discussed in Juster and Staﬀord (1991). The scale
parameter in the production technology for intermediate goods was arbitrarily set to A =
1. Finally, the parameter τ1 was set to 0.7, which is approximately in the middle of the
feasible range of τ1 ∈ (0.5,1). These restrictions are consistent with the following param-
eter values: g0 =3 .5787,g 1 =0 .4995,η=1 .6185,β=0 .9914,τ 0 =0 .0270, and ξ =0 .0094.
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982), and others in the RBC literature, the produc-
tivity shocks were assumed to have a high degree of persistence, and ρp was set to 0.95.
Using quarterly data from 1973:1 to 2000:1, the standard deviation of output was 1.668
percent, implying σp =0 .0092. Following the procedure of Cooley and Hansen (1989), the
3 As a note, the inﬂation rate is close to the 3.61 percent average annual growth rate of
total bank reserves over this period.
18money rule was estimated by regressing the gross growth rate of total bank reserves on a
constant and its lagged value. This regression yielded the estimate ρm =0 .73. Given that
the “nominal distortion” in the model with respect to resource allocations comes form the
inﬂation rate, we used the mean and the standard deviation of the CPI quarterly inﬂation
rate of 1.0 and 0.68 percent, respectively, to obtain implied parameters for the reserves
growth rule, which yielded values for µ =( 1+0 .01)/(1− 0.73) = 3.74, and σm =0 .0046.
IV. Simulation Results.
We report simulation results for four versions of the model.4 The ﬁrst is referred to as
the “baseline model” in which ΩH =Ω I = Ω, such that there are no information frictions
involved in either intermediate goods price setting or in the deposit market. A “sticky
price” version of the model is examined by setting ΩH =Ω ,bu tw h e r eΩ I  =Ω ,t h a ti s ,
intermediate goods producers set the product price after the productivity shock, but prior
to the monetary shock. A third version of the model involving “full precommitment” of
deposits sets ΩI =Ω ,bu tΩ H  = Ω, that is, the deposit market clears after the productivity
shock and prior to the monetary shock. A ﬁnal version of the model involves “partial
precommitment” of deposits by households. Here, again after the productivity shock and
prior to the monetary shock, only a small fraction (one percent) of households precommit
to a deposit position, while the commercial bank continues to preset the deposit rate.
1. Second moments.
Referring to Table 1, all four models predict that the degree of bank intermediation,
measured as the ratio of bank loans to output, is countercyclical, with the correlation
between this measure and output lying in the range of −0.3t o−0.4. These ﬁgures match
the correlation in the data of −0.372 quite well, where bank loans are measured as the
volume of (per capita) commercial and industrial loans of domestically chartered U.S. banks
4 The models were solved using the parameterized expectations algorithm (PEA) de-
veloped by Marcet (1988) and DenHaan and Marcet (1990).
19plus those oﬀered by foreign bank aﬃliates.5 This result is consistent with the previous
ﬁndings of Einarsson and Marquis (2000) and is attributed to the fact that the volume of
deposits, and hence the volume of bank loans, is linked closely to consumption due to the
liquidity services that bank deposits oﬀer households. As with other equilibrium monetary
business cycle models [such as Cooley and Hansen (1989)], the cyclical properties of real
variables in these models are dominated by productivity shocks versus monetary shocks.
Here, a positive productivity shock increases the intermediate goods ﬁrms’ demand for
working capital loans. Banks respond, as is evident by the positive correlation of real bank
loans with output. However, consumption smoothing limits the ability of banks to respond
fully to this increase in loan demand, and as a consequence, ﬁrms rely more heavily on
funds raised in the bond market to meet their working capital expenses. This induces the
countercyclical behavior of the degree of bank intermediation in lending to ﬁrms.
[Insert Table 1.]
From the data, nominal interest rates tend to be relatively smooth, with the percent
standard deviation of the deposit rate, σd =0 .105, less than one-third that of the bond
rate, σb =0 .383, and of the bank lending rate, σv =0 .387. Moreover, the correlations
of the deposit rate with output, ρrd,y =0 .168, and of the bank lending rate with output,
ρrv,y =0 .174, tend be about one-half that of the correlation between the bond rate and
output, ρrb,y =0 .331. However, all of these correlations are much below the nearly perfect
positive correlation between nominal interest rates and output that has been a troublesome
prediction of the “limited participation” models examined by Christiano, et al. (previously
cited). The exception is Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), where a combination
of restrictions that include a costly ﬁnancial asset portfolio adjustment of households and
a partially endogenous monetary policy is required to get this correlation down. Einarsson
and Marquis (2000) show that simply adding a direct lending channel via a bond market
that allows households to adjust their ﬁnancial asset portfolio to shocks, is suﬃcient to
5 Beginning in the 1980s, branches and agencies of foreign banks operating in the United
States have signiﬁcantly increased their market share of C&I loans. This share is currently
around 20%. See McCauley and Seth (1992) and Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) for
discussions.
20match the data on the score, even when there are no information frictions in the model.
These results recur in the “baseline model” of this paper, where interest rates tend to be
smooth, with percent standard deviations near 0.4 (albeit deposit rates are not distinctly
less volatile than the other rates), and more signiﬁcantly where all of the contemporaneous
correlations between interest rates and output are below 0.2. Imposing “sticky prices” does
not substantially alter these predictions. However, introducing deposit precommitment
and presetting of the deposit rate by the banks does aﬀect these predictions by smoothing
interest rates, with percent standard deviations cut nearly in half to a range between 0.16
to 0.29, and by increasing the correlations of interest rates with output, where the latter
are in the range of 0.3 to 0.6 and thus remain far below unity.
The bottom three rows of Table 1 provide the contemporaneous correlations between
the gross growth rate of bank reserves and interest rates. As detailed by Christiano,
et al. (previously cited), nominal interest rates tend to fall contemporaneously with an
increase in the growth rate of nonborrowed reserves. In the ﬁrst column of Table 1, this
“liquidity eﬀect” is suggested by the negative contemporaneous correlations between the
gross growth rate of nonborrowed reserves and the deposit rate, ρµ,rd = −0.185, the bond
rate, ρµ,rb = −0.252, and the bank loan rate, ρµ,rv = −0.145. Without any information
friction, these correlations from the “baseline model” are 0.87 to 0.88, suggesting the
inﬂation premium that is attached to nominal interest rates increases with this acceleration
in the supply of bank reserves, referred to by Christiano (1991) as the long-run Fisherian
fundamentals of nominal interest rates. Imposing sticky prices markedly reduces this
contemporaneous correlation to 0.54, but does not reverse the sign and as will be discussed
below, results in even higher positive cross-correlations in periods following the monetary
shocks. Therefore, the ad hoc imposition of sticky prices is not suﬃcient to bring about a
decline in interest rates in response to a surprise acceleration in the supply of bank reserves.
These results are consistent with Christiano, et al. (1997) for the parameterization of their
model with log-linear utility.6
6 By reducing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, Christiano et
al. (1997) were able to obtain a liquidity eﬀect. However, as they emphasize, this feature
came at the expense of a signiﬁcant deterioration in the predictions of the “sticky price”
version of their model along other dimensions.
21Imposing the alternative information friction whereby households precommit to a
deposit position and banks preset the deposit rate prior to the monetary shock is suﬃcient
to generate a liquidity eﬀect. In the “full precommitment” model, nominal interest rates
all decline with the monetary shock. The deposit and bank lending rates have correlations
with the gross growth rate of bank reserves that are negative and similar in value to
the data, with ρµ,rd = −0.16 and ρµ,rv = −0.23. The bond rate appears to be more
systematically responsive to the shock, with a stronger negative correlation with output
at ρµ,rb = −0.41 than appears in the data. With “partial precommitment,” when only
one percent of the households precommit to their deposit position, but banks still preset
the deposit rate, the liquidity eﬀect is seen to be weaker. In particular, the bond rate
correlation with the gross growth rate of bank reserves falls to ρµ,rb = −0.26, which is very
close to the data, while the correlations of reserves growth with the deposit rate and the
bank lending remain low at ρµ,rd = ρµ,rv = −0.13, as in the data.
To examine the liquidity eﬀect in more detail, Table 2 displays the cross-correlations
of the bond rate with output for each of the four models and compares that with the data.
The data indicate that a signiﬁcant lead-lag relationship between nonborrowed reserves
and the 90-day commercial paper rate exists with negative leads and small, positive lags
of non-borrowed reserves over the bond rate, and where the strongest liquidity eﬀect is
not contemporaneous, but occurs with a lag of one quarter, i.e., ρrb
t,µt−1 = −0.27. This
pattern is not matched by either the “baseline” model or the “sticky price” model, where
the inﬂation tax eﬀect is very strong. Contrary to these predictions, both of the “precom-
mitment models” yield a similar pattern of cross-correlations to those observed in the data,
with the strongest eﬀect occurring with a one-quarter lag. While the correlations appear
stronger in both models than is observed in the data, and the “partial precommitment”
model has slightly lower values, there is not much to choose between the two models on
this score.
[Insert Table 2.]
To diﬀerentiate between these two “precommitment” models, refer to the statistics in
Table 1 concerning investment and consumption. For the “full precommitment” model,
22both consumption and investment are signiﬁcantly more volatility and much less correlated
with output than is found in the data. Most striking is the counterfactual prediction that
consumption is more volatile than output, with the model predicting σc =2 .07 versus
σc =0 .921 in the data. Investment is approximately ﬁfty perent more volatile than in
the data with σi =9 .43 in the model versus σi =6 .277 in the data. These statistics also
imply that the model predicts a negative correlation between consumption and investment.
Finally, the correlation between consumption and output is ρc,y =0 .43 versus ρc,y =0 .849
in the data, and the correlation between investment and output is ρi,y =0 .51 versus
ρi,y =0 .943 in the data. For most researchers these counterfactual predictions would be
suﬃcient grounds to reject the model as is.
However, when the fraction of households precommiting to their deposit position prior
to the money shock is reduced to one percent, eﬀectively limiting the information friction
to the bank’s presetting of deposit rates, the resulting “partial precommitment” model
yields predictions for the second moments of consumption and investment that are much
more in line with the data. Consumption volatility, with a percent standard deviation of
σc =1 .51, is still too high, but is signiﬁcantly less than output, while investment actually
becomes slightly smoother than is observed in the data, with σi =5 .52. In addition, the
correlations between consumption and output and between investment and output are high
at ρc,y =0 .80 and ρi,y =0 .74, which are much more in accord with the data.
2. Impulse response functions.
To examine in greater detail the dynamic properties of the models that produced the
business cycle statistics described above, the impulse response functions of key variables
related to productivity and monetary shocks are computed and displayed in Figures 1-6.
The response of the “baseline” model to a productivity shock is similar to that for the
“sticky price” model, thus only the results of the former are shown in Figure 1. A positive
productivity shock is seen to increase employment (Figure 1a) and output (Figure 1b), with
an attendant rise in the need for working capital ﬁnance by ﬁrms. This greater funding
need is ﬁnanced in part by an increase in real bonds (Figure 1c) and to a lesser extent
by an increase in real bank loans (Figure 1d). Consumption-smoothing causes a lesser
23percentage increase in consumption (Figure 1e) than in investment (Figure 1f), and as a
consequence households allocate a greater share of the increase in ﬁnancial wealth to bonds
than to liquid assets (money and bank deposits). Bank loans, therefore, cannot respond to
the same extent as the supply of bonds, with the tighter loan market inducing a sharper
increase in the bank lending rate (Figure 1g) than in the bond rate (Figure 1h). Note that
this lesser degree of responsiveness in the supply of bank loans relative to bonds causes
the degree of bank intermediation to decline. This mechanism is the dominant factor that
induces the countercyclicality in the degree of bank intermediation over the business cycle.
[Insert Figure 1.]
The impulse response functions of the two “precommitment” models to a positive pro-
ductivity shock are also similar to each other. In Figure 2, the impulse response functions
associated with a productivity shock in the “partial precommitment” model are displayed.
Qualitatively, the responses look much like those of the “baseline” model. However, quan-
titatively, the increases in employment, output, consumption, and investment (Figures
2a,2b,2e,2f) are all greater in the “partial precommitment” model. This is due to the
fact that interest rates do not respond as strongly as before, with a greater eﬀect on the
bank loan rate (Figure 2g) than on the bond rate (Figure 2h). This lesser rise in both
rates mitigates the impact of the shock on the ﬁnancing costs of intermediate goods ﬁrms,
which therefore expand employment and output to an even greater extent. In addition,
while both the bond and bank loan markets expand, there is an even greater percentage
increase in real bonds (Figure 2c) than in real bank loans (Figure 2d) relative to what was
evidenced in the “baseline” model. In isolation, this factor tends to cause the degree of
bank intermediation to become even more strongly countercyclical.
[Insert Figure 2.]
Figures 3 and 4 display the impulse response functions for the “baseline” and “sticky
price” models to a positive shock to the growth rate of bank reserves. The reserves injection
raises the quantity of nominal bank lending in the initial quarter by an identical amount
in the two models. However, because prices are ﬁxed in the “sticky price” model in the
24initial period, the increase in real bank lending is greater in that model. Unlike the limited
participation models of Christiano et al. (previously cited), bank lending only represents a
portion of the funds available to ﬁrms to fund their working capital expenses. It is necessary
to examine the equilibrium response of the bond market to determine how this reserves
injection aﬀects the total allocation of short-term credit to ﬁrms. As discussed above,
the absence of a liquidity eﬀect causes nominal rates in both models to rise. However,
compared with the “sticky price” model, the “baseline” model causes an even greater
percentage increase in anticipated inﬂation, such that the initial increases in real interest
rates [Figures 3(i,j) and 4(i,j)] are higher in the “sticky price” model. As a consequence, the
intermediate goods ﬁrms experience a greater increase in their borrowing cost in the “sticky
price” model and reduce their demand for labor to an even greater extent. Therefore, the
increase in real bank loans (Figures 3d and 4d) brought about by the reserves injection is
more than oﬀset by the decrease in real bonds (Figures 3c and 4c) in both models, with
this response more pronounced in the “sticky price” model.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4.]
In addition, with higher real interest rates, employment (Figures 3a and 4a) and output
(Figures 3band 4b ) b oth decline more sharply when prices are sticky. Also, with prices
ﬁxed in the initial period of the shock, and with the liquid asset allocation having already
been predetermined, consumption (Figure 4e) does not respond (from the payment system
constraint). However, with prices rising in the “baseline” model, consumption (Figure 3e)
will initially decline. Therefore, in the “sticky price” model, investment (Figure 3f) must
absorb not only the greater decline in output, but a lesser allocation of output, than in the
baseline model (Figure 3e), given that the propensity to consume is higher. This tends to
add persistence to the response of the real economy to monetary shocks. Finally, in both
models a reserves injection increases the degree of bank intermediation while output falls,
thus compounding the countercyclical response of bank intermediation over the business
cycle induced by productivity shocks. This eﬀect shows up in Table 1 with the relatively
high correlation ﬁgures for ρ(V  /py),y for these models.
Figures 5 and 6 display the impulse response functions for the two “precommitment”
25models to a positive shock to the growth rate of bank reserves. With prices ﬂexible,
the price level rises immediately while inﬂation expectations decrease, either already on
impact (the “full precommitment” model), or from quarter three onwards (the “partial
precommitment” model.) In both models, the information friction is suﬃcient to induce
a “liquidity eﬀect,” with declines occurring in both the nominal bank loan rate (Figures
5g and 6g) and the nominal bond rate (Figures 5h and 6h). The decline in nominal rates
is strong enough to bring about a fall in the real interest rates [Figures (5i,j) and 6(i,j)].
Declining real interest rates reduce the borrowing costs for intermediate goods producers,
who increase their hiring, and employment (Figures 5a and 6a) and output (Figures 5b
and 6b) rise. Greater household income increases the ﬁnancial wealth of households, but
with a disproportionate share being allocated to bonds due to consumption smoothing,
and deposit precommitment. Therefore, in nominal terms, ﬁrms meet their increased
borrowing needs more with bonds than with bank loans, and to such an extent that with
the higher price level, the volume of real bank loans (Figures 5d and 6d) declines, while
the volume of real bonds (Figures 5c and 6c) rises.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6.]
There are two eﬀects of the higher degree of deposit precommitment that are evidenced
by these simulations. First, a greater precommitment of deposits further curtails the ability
of banks to raise deposit funds to meet the higher loan demand. As a consequence, the
degree of bank intermediation in the initial periods is more sharply reduced in the “full
precommitment” model than in the “partial precommitment” model.
Second, the higher degree of deposit precommitment reduces consumption (Figures
5e and 6e) through the payments system constraint. As a consequence, the propensity
to consume in the initial periods declines, and a greater share of the higher output is
allocated to investment (Figures 5f and 6f). This adds persistence to the real eﬀects of the
monetary shocks. In the limit of the “full precommitment” case, this characteristic of the
dynamics of the model results in the excess volatility of both consumption and investment
as described above, and as reported in Table 1.
263. Persistence in the liquidity eﬀect.
An issue that has been of some concern to the literature on “limited participation”
models is the inherent lack of persistence in the liquidity eﬀect of a reserves injection into
the banking system. [See Christiano (1991, 1992) for discussions.] The data suggest that
the short-run decline in nominal interest rates could be present for up to six quarters after
the shock [Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997)]. By contrast, deposit precommit-
ment in models without a bond market typically yield only a one-period liquidity eﬀect.
To overcome this shortcoming of the models, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) have
proposed the introduction of small adjustment costs in the process by which households
modify their deposit position in response to a monetary (reserves) shock.
In the “precommitment” versions of the model proposed in this paper, the presence of
the bond market allows ﬂexibility in the household’s ﬁnancial asset portfolio selection that
enhances the persistence of the liquidity eﬀect. To illustrate this feature of the model, a
version with “full precommitment,” but without the bond market is calibrated, estimated,
and simulated.7 The simulation results are then compared with the “full precommitment”
version above, which was selected due to the fact it had the strongest liquidity eﬀect.
In Figure 7, impulse response functions to a one standard deviation reserves shock
are presented for the two “full precommitment” models, one including the bond market
(the model described in the text), and the other without a bond market. Note in panels
7a and 7bthat the response of the nominal price level diﬀers qualitatively b etween the
two models. With the bond market present, Figure 7a, there is an immediate increase and
overshooting of the nominal price level. It then declines slowly and monotonically to its
7 This required the obvious modiﬁcations to the household’s budget constraint, and
to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and ﬁnancing constraint. The calibration was altered by
setting τ1 = 0 in the ﬁrm’s “portfolio adjustment cost function,” equation (40), and having
the banks ﬁnance all of the intermediate goods ﬁrms’ wage bill. The implication of this
calibration is to impose a convex cost structure on bank loans, with the marginal cost
of the loan rising with the size of the loan. To maintain equal marginal costs of total
borrowing across the two model versions (evaluated in the steady state), τ0 was lowered
to 0.0065. This is the minimal change that we could make to the model while dropping
out the bond market, and it is still seen to be suﬃcient to eliminate the persistence in the
liquidity eﬀect.
27new steady-state value.
By contrast, when the bond market is absent, Figure 7b, the price level monotonically
approaches the new steady state from below. This diﬀerence owes to the role played by
the bond market in the household’s absorption of the additional nominal income that
results from the reserves injection. In both models, the reserves injection increases the
funds available for banks to lend and there is a rise in the ﬁrm’s total nominal borrowings.
These additional funds increase the household’s nominal income from wages and proﬁts.
In the absence of a bond market, with deposits precommited and nominal consumption
predetermined, the only choice in the allocation of these additional funds that is available
to the household is to increase its nominal money holdings, which mitigates the price
adjustment that would otherwise take place in order to match the household’s expected
real money demand for the upcoming period. This implies that inﬂation is expected to
rise in the future, which attaches a higher inﬂation premium to nominal interest rates.
In Figure 7f, the bank loan rate is seen to respond with an immediate overshooting of
nominal rate above its long-run trend, hence precluding any persistent liquidity eﬀect
from materializing. Alternatively, when a bond market is available to the household to
help absorb this shock, the household is free to choose to carry less of its additional
ﬁnancial wealth forward in the form of nominal money holdings, and the resulting price
level must rise more abruptly to accommodate the future expected real money demand.
As a consequence, the inﬂation premia in nominal rates remain low, and the liquidity eﬀect
persists as shown in Figure 7e. This portfolio response is illustrated in Figure 7g by the
plot of the ratio of money to the sum of money plus bonds. It is seen that the demand for
money relative to bonds is initially below its long-run equilibrium and that the adjustment
path is relatively long-lived.
[Insert Figure 7.]
Because these bonds are used to ﬁnance working capital, the siphoning oﬀ of nominal
income into the bond market allows ﬁrms meet their ﬁnancing needs without relying en-
tirely on the bank’s ability to raise additional deposit funds. As a consequence, the supply
of funds available to ﬁrms (bank loans plus bonds), Figure 7c, exceeds the supply that is
28available in the absence of a bond market, Figure 7d, with the former exhibiting a high
degree of persistence.
Therefore, viewed from this perspective, in the presence of a bond market, this addi-
tional supply eﬀect drives down the nominal interest rate to a greater extent, thus resulting
in a persistent liquidity eﬀect; whereas, in the absence of the bond market, the liquidity
eﬀect is very weak and lasts only for one period. Table 3 reports the cross-correlations
between reserves growth and the bank loan rate in the two models. With the bond market
present, the lead-lag relationship generated by the model accord well with the U.S. data
(where the bank loan rate is taken to be the prime lending rate). However, in the model
without a bond market, the weak contemporaneous liquidity eﬀect is seen to be dominated
by the “inﬂation tax” eﬀect at all relevant correlations.
[Insert Table 3.]
While the “full precommitment” model is used in this section to illustrate the mech-
anism that induces persistence in the liquidity eﬀect, the “partial precommitment” model
with a bond market present exhibits similar qualitative features. The principal diﬀerence
is that the price level overshooting portrayed in Figure 7a is much more muted, and the
peak response does not occur until three periods (quarters) after the monetary shock.
V. Conclusions.
It is commonly believed by policy makers that open market operations that ease the supply
of bank reserves will induce a temporary, but persistent decline in short-term nominal
interest rates. Falling rates will then stimulate real activity until inﬂation expectations
associated with the more rapid rate of growth of the money supply that ensues drives
borrowing costs higher and subsequently retards the economy’s expansion. Attempting to
capture this intuition in a theoretical model has proven challenging, given that rational
expectatations, general equilibrium models are unable to deliver this dynamic response to
an increase in the growth rate of bank reserves without a signiﬁcant market friction. Chari,
et al. (1995) and Christiano et al. (1991,1995,1997) have examined one such friction in the
29form of a precommitment of households to a liquid asset position that was ﬁrst suggested
by Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992). These models are capable of delivering this dynamic
response, where banks acquire deposit funds from households to lend to ﬁrms, which in
turn use the proceeds to fund their working capital expenses. However, in practice, a large
share of working capital is ﬁnanced by direct lending, and U.S. data suggest that the role
that banks play in this process has cyclical properties, with a larger role being played
during recessions and a lesser role during expansions.
This paper extends this literature on “liquidity eﬀects” by developing a model in
which ﬁrms can choose to raise funds either by borrowing from banks or by issuing bonds.
The simulation exercises reported in this paper indicate that “sticky prices” are neither
necessary nor suﬃcient to generate a liquidity eﬀect (for logarithmic utility); however,
information frictions in the deposit market may produce a “liquidity eﬀect” and at the
same time match the countercyclical role played by banks in funding working capital
expenses of ﬁrms. These information frictions manifest themselves in two ways. One is
the precommitment by households to a deposit position prior to the monetary (reserves)
shock. The second is that the deposit rate is preset prior to the monetary shock. When
both of these frictions are operative, the model yields excess volatility in consumption and
investment that calls into question the validity of the theory. However, when the deposit
precommitment is minimal, such that the principal restriction is a preset deposit rate,
the liquidity eﬀect is still present, bank intermediation remains countercyclical, and the
behavior of consumption and investment is much more in line with the data.
These results suggest that research in this area may beneﬁt by shifting the focus
toward the interest rate policies of banks. Three features of these policies could proﬁtably
be explored. First, deposit rates on transaction accounts move quite sluggishly, given that
they represent average rather than marginal rates. Second, interest rates paid on managed
liablities are more responsive to market rates; however, managed liabilities represent only
a small fraction of deposit funds. Third, interest rates on bank loans to ﬁrms are normally
tied to lines of credit. These agreements typically have loan conditions attached that
reﬂect the ﬁrms qualiﬁcation for drawing down their lines of credit, and these conditions
are subject to change. All of these issues may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the cyclical properties
30of bank lending, and hence its role in transmitting monetary policy decisions to the real
economy.
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33variable, x σ x ρ xy σ x ρ xy σ x ρ xy σ x ρ xy σ x ρ xy
output, y 1.668 1.000 1.64 1.00 1.63 1.00 1.62 1.00 1.77 1.00
consumption, c 0.921 0.849 1.12 0.97 1.13 0.91 2.07 0.43 1.51 0.80
investment, i 6.277 0.943 5.66 0.71 4.62 0.90 9.43 0.51 5.52 0.74
employment, n 1.563 0.899 0.61 0.78 0.77 0.70 1.11 0.66 1.14 0.84
deposit rate, r
d 0.105 0.168 0.38 0.18 0.43 0.19 0.18 0.51 0.16 0.61
bond rate, r
b 0.383 0.331 0.44 0.13 0.49 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.18 0.43
bank lending rate, r
v 0.387 0.174 0.42 0.18 0.47 0.19 0.29 0.50 0.17 0.61
real bonds, B’/P 2.86 0.78 3.52 0.72 4.41 0.66 4.03 0.85
real loans, V’/P 3.387 0.077 1.58 0.71 1.72 0.54 2.44 0.38 1.84 0.77
degree of bank intermediation, V’/Py 3.652 -0.372 1.22 -0.42 1.60 -0.42 2.36 -0.29 1.23 -0.30
ρ µ , rd
ρ µ ,  rb
ρ µ , rv
Notes:  Data on the deposit rate and stock and flows of consumer durables were provided by the Federal Reserve Board.
             All remaining data were extracted from the FAME database.  All series were HP-filtered.  
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lag, s 43210- 1 - 2 - 3 - 4
U.S. Data (1973:1-2000:1)
90-day Commercial -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.27 -0.25 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.06
Paper Rate
Baseline 0.16 0.32 0.52 0.71 0.88 0.45 0.17 -0.02 -0.14
Model
"Sticky" Price 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.74 0.55 0.22 0.03 -0.11 -0.17
Model
Full Precommitment -0.22 -0.32 -0.43 -0.57 -0.42 -0.13 0.07 0.18 0.24
Model
Partial Precommitment -0.19 -0.27 -0.39 -0.56 -0.27 -0.04 0.11 0.19 0.23
Model
Notes:  s = number of periods that µ t leads r
b
t.
            All data are HP-filtered.
Table 2:  Cross-correlations of the Bond Rate with the
Gross Growth Rate of Nonborrowed ReservesCorr(r
v
t, µ t-s)
lag, s 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4
U.S. Data (1973:1-2000:1)
Prime Lending Rate -0.10 -0.10 -0.16 -0.23 -0.15 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.09
Full Precommitment -0.24 -0.30 -0.37 -0.43 -0.21 0.01 0.14 0.22 0.24
With a Bond Market
Full Precommitment 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04
Without a Bond Market
Notes:  s = number of periods that µ t leads r
v
t.
            All data are HP-filtered.
Table 3:  Cross-correlations of the Bank Loan Rate with the


















































Figure 1:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      productivity shock in the "baseline" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate


















































Figure 2:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      productivity shock in the "partial precommitment" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate


















































Figure 3:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      monetary (reserves) shock in the "baseline" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate


















































Figure 4:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      monetary (reserves) shock in the "sticky price" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate


















































Figure 5:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      monetary (reserves) shock in the "full precommitment" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate


















































Figure 6:  Response to a one-standard deviation
      monetary (reserves) shock in the "partial precommitment" model
a.  employment b.  output
c.  real bonds d.  real loans
e.  consumption f.  investment
g.  nominal bank lending rate h.  nominal bond rate






























Figure 7:  Response to a one-standard deviation monetary (reserves) shock  
     in "full precommitment" models with and without a bond market
Model with a Bond Market                                    Model without a Bond Market
a.  nominal price level b. nominal price level
c.  real bonds plus bank loans d. real bank loans
e.  nominal bank lending rate f.  nominal bank lending rate
g.  ratio of money to money plus bonds
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